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Changes in the Party System in the Context  
of Deconsolidation of Democracy in Poland 
Abstract: The party system and the parties within it were ones of the relevant elements of 
system transformation in Poland. We can identify several significant determinants of the 
process with regard to this area. The first of them is formal standards and their influence 
on the course of political competition. The second is the functions attributed to political 
parties in the political and party system. The third one is connected with the significance of 
social structure’s specificity and its influence on voting behaviors. The fourth determinant is 
the models of competition at the cabinet level. The paper presents these four determinants 
of development of political parties and the party system in Poland in the perspective of 
democratization processes.
Keywords: Polish party system, Polish political parties, functions of political parties, 
models of competition at the cabinet level, voting behaviors in Poland
Many dimensions of activity of political system display some balance between democratic 
and authoritarian solutions. The democratic ones assume that the minimum conditions of 
pluralism must be observed and citizens must participate in exercising power and control-
ling the authorities. The authoritarian ones involve the departure from the balance towards 
the primacy of one type of authority (Levitsky, Way, 2002, p. 53). In the classic separation of 
powers and in other system solutions alike, it is always the primacy of the executive author-
ity, usually reflected in the rule of strong individuals whose political DNA includes the gene 
of strengthening and enhancing their power. The dynamics of democratization processes 
can be defined as competition between powers interested in expanding the principles of 
democracy and those that want to preserve the authoritarian rule. 
The party system is an important component of this competition. It is the effect of the 
accumulation of different determinants of political competition in this area (Mair, 1996, 
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pp. 96–98). One of the most vital of them is formal standards and their influence on the 
course of political competition. The second is the functions attributed to political parties 
in the political and party system. The third one is connected with the significance of social 
structure’s specificity and its influence on voting behaviors. The fourth determinant is the 
models of competition at the cabinet level. The paper presents these four determinants 
of development of political parties and the party system in Poland in the perspective of 
democratization processes and its deconsolidation.
Deconsolidation of Democracy
The research on democracy deconsolidation processes began in the 1970s, when scholars 
noticed significant cracks in liberal democracies (Sartori, 1976, p. 220). Deconsolidation 
is understood as permanent and multilayer division of functional referents of democracy 
and the actual political practice. As we seek the sources of deconsolidation of contempo-
rary democracies, we can identify several reasons for it. One reason is that the principles of 
the capitalist economic system have deviated from its original rules, originating from the 
democratic legal framework. As a result, nowadays, economic interests prevail over social 
ones, reducing citizens’ subjectivity in favor of supranational economic structures (Reich, 
2008, p. 38). Another possible cause of deconsolidation of democracy is the crisis of political 
representation, which may have its sources in the weakening of traditional socio-political 
divisions (Lipset, Rokkan, 1967, pp. 8–11) and increased personalization of elections (Turska-
Kawa, Wojtasik, 2019, p. 13). And finally, the transformations in party systems, essentially 
involving changes in the patterns of competition between political parties, can also be 
regarded as a deconsolidation factor (Levitski, Ziblatt, 2018, p. 48). 
Processes of democratic deconsolidation take place on two basic planes. The first one 
is the political system level: the political system becomes less stable and predictable, and 
democratic procedures are less recurrent (Poguntke, Webb, 2009, pp. 4–7). This may lead to 
increased institutional instability of the sphere of politics and reduced efficiency of exercising 
power (Condrat, 2006, p. 12). The second plane is the social one, where the relationships 
between citizens and the sphere of politics as well as between voters and their political 
representatives become weaker (Staubager, 2008, p. 334). Consequently, citizens have the ten-
dency to display less respect for the previous standards and patterns of behavior (Diamond 
1994, 15), and voters display greater electoral volatility (Turska-Kawa, 2015, p. 117). 
Party systems are recognized as a factor of democracy deconsolidation for several 
reasons. The first one is the change of patterns of political competition, especially at the 
level of elections. Currently, their essence is the departure from values and ideologies in 
favor of political efficacy. This is also associated with a change of the basic function of elec-
tions, which are no longer a factor linking voters and the political system but have become 
a mechanism of political disintegration (Linz, 1994, pp. 17–18). Another reason for studying 
the deconsolidation of democracy with regard to changes in party systems is the evolution 
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of the political party model into market organizations (Mair, Müller, Plasser, 2004, p. 11). 
The last reason is the change in the logic of competition between political parties at the 
cabinet level, connected with the emergence of new, clearly populist political entities.
The case of Poland and democracy deconsolidation processes is also interesting because 
of the geographical location of the object of research in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
The countries in this region went through the process of democratization in the last decade 
of the 20th century, so neither lasting bonds between social groups and political parties have 
developed there nor the system of democratic standards and values has taken root so far. 
It can be presumed, then, that the mechanisms of democracy deconsolidation in Poland 
and other CEE countries differ from those in countries with longer democratic traditions, 
e.g., negative effects of European integration (Agh, 2016, p. 9). Researchers also point to the 
low level of trust and dissatisfaction with the functioning of political system institutions in 
Poland (Foa, Mounk, 2017, p. 13). This indicates that the party system and its functioning 
is one of the possible factors of deconsolidation of democracy.
Formal Standards
The normative status of political parties results from prediction of their institutional stratifi-
cation. It is also the dimension of expectations concerning the functions they are attributed 
in the political system. This institutionalization also includes models of behaviors which 
result from the existing system of social references. Democratic institutionalization processes 
involve both the aspect of political competition and the stabilization of expected models of 
behavior (Diamond, 1994, p. 15). Institutionalization is a necessary condition of consolida-
tion of democratic procedures, which determines its two basic phases. The formal-political 
phase is the creation of system foundations, initiation of transformation processes, and en-
suring the desired form. The socio-cultural phase allows the social adaptation of the adopted 
solutions and uses them to create a commonly approved inventory of universal democratic 
values (Morawski, 1998, pp. 202–203). The pluralization of the Polish party system was very 
dynamic, breaking the classic principles of democratization process. Before the legal status 
of political parties was established in 1990, several dozen political organizations had been 
formed that called themselves parties. As a result of this mechanism, the legislator initially 
had to accept the existing situation and create an inventory of rules of party formation and 
functioning based on previous experiences. It was only the provisions of the Act on Political 
Parties of 1997 that really reflected people’s expectations of formal solutions (The Act on 
Political Parties, 1997).
The first Act on Political Parties of 1990 was an attempt to create functional solutions 
in the political system with consideration of the contemporary level of development of 
party movements. Before the parliament adopted that act, parties (apart from the three 
alliances originating from the former communist regime) had been operating in a kind 
of gray area. This was the effect of lack of standards of party formation and supervision. 
Waldemar Wojtasik 58
Consequently, there was no specific formal control of their functioning, either, except some 
general regulations. Thus, the act that was drafted then had to assume the acceptance of the 
existing political reality. Experiences of the dynamic formation of political parties and the 
intention to avoid producing any excessive barriers to party activity resulted in adopting 
the way of registering political parties which was an institutional incentive for citizens to 
engage in the sphere of politics. The society getting out of communism was weak, both 
in terms of civic virtue and or democratic competence. Poles had to learn political and 
party participation. Therefore, the adopted mode of registering political parties was less 
procedurally burdensome than other possible solutions. The intention was to establish the 
registration procedure that would open the way for the expressions of political activity 
displayed by social organizations (e.g., trade unions or existing associations) which had 
engaged in the sphere of politics before.
The current Act on Political Parties was adopted by the parliament in 1997. It defines 
a political party as a voluntary organization with a specific name, whose objective is to 
participate in public life by exerting democratic influence to shape the state’s policy and 
exercise public authority. The act changed the registration procedure dramatically. The 
registration model was introduced instead of the recording one. This model assumes that 
certain procedural requirements must be met before a party acquires legal personality. 
The record of parties is kept by the District Court in Warsaw. Upon meeting all the legal 
requirements, the party must be registered, and the Court may not refuse the registration. 
The new mode resulted in greater subjectivization of the registration authority. It resulted 
from extending the inventory of formal conditions to be met in order to be recorded as 
a political party. The change of the model of political parties registration was mostly the 
effect of stabilization of the party system structure. It was no longer necessary to apply 
simplified registration processes to form parties.
The last aspect of creating normative framework for the activity of the party system in 
Poland was the provisions of the Constitution of 1997 (The Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland, 1997) The Constitution only included two articles directly referring to the regulation 
of political parties. Article 11 ensured freedom for the creation and functioning of political 
parties and allowed them to influence the formulation of the policy of the State by democratic 
means. The financing of political parties was made open to public inspection. In Article 
13, the Constitution prohibited political parties whose programmes refer to totalitarian 
ideologies or sanction racial or national hatred. It also prohibited the legal operation of 
organizations which apply violence for the purpose of obtaining power or to influence the 
State policy, and ones that provide for the secrecy of their own structure or membership. 
However, although the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 
are extensive, political parties are only mentioned marginally in the document (Wojtasik, 
2009, p. 156).
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Functions of Political Parties
Being an inseparable element of the democratic mechanism, political parties should serve 
the functions they are attributed in the system (Key, 1966, p. 76). The character of the Polish 
party system, especially regarding the role the parties serve in the processes of system trans-
formation and stabilization, enables us to identify and evaluate their functions. One problem 
may be the diversity of party origins, especially as we take into consideration the evolution 
of their ideological profile. Yet, we should not treat this difference as an absolutizing factor, 
which would determine the character of performance of political parties’ main functions. 
Thus, if there is a relationship between parties playing certain roles in the political system 
and particular goals of their activity, then the special character of functional relationships 
will be visible in the way of achieving those goals. The role of parties in non-democratic 
regimes is totally different, on the one hand because of their different role assumed in the 
political system, and on the other hand because of unavoidable limitations. In non-demo-
cratic systems, parties serve the functions attributed by the real centers of power, and their 
main role is limited to supporting the regime. They also perform some specific functions, 
especially ones that result in the formation and control of public opinion as expected by the 
authorities, and in licensing political activity (Schedler, 2010, pp. 73–74). 
There are many theoretical approaches to the typology of political parties (Sobolewska-
Myślik, 2004, pp. 24–28). In the case of countries undergoing a democratic transformation, 
it is important to identify such categories of functions that will be minimally overlapping 
and maximally coincident within the identified general categories. It is impossible to fully 
avoid their overlapping and co-occurrence, but this should not be the factor disqualifying 
the very idea of the typology. Given the above-mentioned arguments, the following groups of 
functions of political parties can be identified in the presented model: (1) autonomous ones 
(organizational function, recruitment function, communication function); (2) ideological 
and programme ones (axiological function, integration function, the function of articula-
tion and aggregation of social interests, programme function); (3) representation ones 
(social function, selection function, electoral function); (4) creation ones (participation 
function, governance function, delegation function) (Migalski, Wojtasik, Mazur, 2006, pp. 
81–102).
As regards the autonomous functions, we need to make three reservations that allow the 
analysis of their performance in Poland. First, organizationally, the existence of a political 
party is the result of the current legal situation, especially specific regulations. This issue is 
described above, when discussing changes in Polish legislation concerning political parties. 
The normative determinant usually forces certain solutions (and limitations) concerning the 
structure, hierarchization and control of political parties. Second, a party’s way of operation 
is largely the result of the structural model that the party represents (Sokół, Żmigorodzki, 
2003, pp. 29–34). Thus, the character of party’s organization determines its way of operation, 
e.g., in terms of the course of decision-making process. Third, the relations between the 
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above-mentioned autonomous functions are weak, which may suggest the research perspec-
tive of analyzing individual functions, not the phenomenon as a whole. In comparison with 
consolidated democracies, the highest specificity in this group of functions occurs in the 
processes of recruitment and communication.
The group if ideological and programme functions, unlike the organizational ones, refers 
to quite abstract categories. This does not mean, however, that these functions are socially less 
important. The contemporary democracy manifests a deficit of values, connected e.g., with 
the crisis of the representation system. Parties try to fill in this gap through the adaptation 
of universal values to the ideological plane. In the beginning of the system transformation, 
the support for democratic changes in Poland was very high. It was natural for Poles to 
adapt the values connected with freedom and political pluralism to the Polish context. The 
gradual erosion of social support for the democratic system of values occurred later, though 
the support was still quite high. 
The performance of representation functions is based on the fundamental democratic 
procedures. It is connected with the system of relationships between voters, parties and au-
thority institutions. The procedures mostly refer to the application of political representation 
principle in a democratic state. The model representation system serves at least four basic 
functions: (1) it generally ensures that social demands are reflected in concrete programmes 
and political activities; (2) it allows the society to influence the choice of representatives who 
will carry out concrete political activities; (3) it ensures electoral legitimization of both the 
elected representatives and their activities; (4) it gives the voters control over the election, 
exercised by means of limited terms of elected offices (Migalski, Wojtasik, Mazur, 2006, p. 89). 
The main problem in parties’ performance of representation functions in Poland is their weak 
social institutionalization. Effective performance of the functions is possible when parties 
are strongly rooted in the social structure. It allows the structure of socio-political relations 
which will ensure directional (i.e. the least collision-prone from the point of view of social 
interests) performance of the state’s policy, and political legitimization of its activities.
The operation of Polish political parties in terms of creative functions translates into 
the state’s policy. Activities taken in this respect may be direct or indirect. The creative 
functions performed directly are clear for the observer, measurable for the researcher, 
and usually justified from the point of view of logic of power. At the social level, they are 
reflected in satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the activities taken, and gaining or loss of 
support (including electoral support). Comparing them to the above-mentioned other kinds 
of functions of political parties, the performance of creative functions mostly affects the 
ongoing evaluation by voters (Manin, Przeworski, Stokes, 1999, p. 30). This may make parties 
fall into the trap of populism, characterized by parties popularizing views and engaging 
in activities oriented at acquiring public plaudits, not solving current problems. This trap 
may equally refer to parties exercising power and ones in the opposition. But while political 
contestation of those necessary activities of the authorities is part of the logic of being in the 
opposition, growing duality was visible in the case of Polish political parties, especially after 
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1997: the need of ruling and being in the opposition at the same time. The effect of that was 
poorer quality of governance and performance of other creative functions in Poland.
Social Structure and Voting Behaviors
One of the predictors of political parties’ behavior is their being rooted in the social structure. 
Thus, changes in the political structure of the community will affect the evolution of parties’ 
methods of activity (Bartolini, Mair, 1990, pp. 34–36). In the beginning of democratic evolu-
tion, there was a common view that the categories of the left and right wing were inadequate 
for the description of political reality in Poland (Szawiel, 2001, p. 227). The diagnosis that the 
left wing won and the right wing lost the 1993 parliamentary election was only adopted after 
the election was over (Antoszewski, 2005, p. 20). The post-communist division developed 
in the social awareness then. It divided the political space into post-communist left wing 
and post-Solidarity right wing. The end of its formation influence was the parliamentary 
election of 2005, when the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) with the post-communist origin 
suffered a defeat (Wojtasik, 2010, p. 41). Some symptoms that suggested a change of the 
1990s political system of reference were even visible in the results of the 2001 parliamentary 
election, when the coalition of SLD and post-Solidarity Labor United (UP) won but par-
ties that did not directly refer to any genetic criterion – Samoobrona and League of Polish 
Families (LPR) – also got to the Sejm (Wojtasik, 2009, p. 157). 
It turned out that the 2005 election initiated the period of political marginalization of 
formations declaring leftist ideas. The marginalization is understood as considerable loss 
of electoral support in relation to the previous period and the lack of real influence on the 
ongoing competition in the cabinet. Changes in the left wing also affected the other side of 
the political scene, monopolized by the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and Justice (PiS). 
We may, however, have some doubts with regard to the structure of the party scene: was 
there really any left wing (in terms of ideology) if the actual political dichotomy was between 
two rightist parties? After 2005, there have been some changes in the political attitudes of 
Polish community which lend credence to the possibility of permanent marginalization of 
the leftist parties. The latest decade, especially the 2015 parliamentary election, proves that 
this is actually happening. After that election, SLD did not exceed the electoral threshold, 
and for the first time since the beginning of the system transformation no party referring 
to leftist ideologies went into the parliament.
A study by Agnieszka Turska-Kawa and Waldemar Wojtasik (2010, pp. 123–138) shows 
that in the Polish society there is no strong variety in left/right self-identification declarations. 
It proves that the analysis of differences in left-right declarations against the background 
of socio-demographic data gives negative results. There were few statistically significant 
differences. Although there was some variety in the means, it rather shows some tendencies 
than concrete conclusions. This result corresponds to other analyses of ideological identities 
presented in literature, suggesting that orientations after 1992 evade the influence of the 
Waldemar Wojtasik 62
basic socio-demographic factors (Godlewski, 2008, pp. 133–163). The analysis of respondents’ 
self-identifications with reference to party preferences shows the structuring of Polish party 
scene with extreme points in the form of parties with leftist and rightist origin (SLD and 
PiS). The quantitative analysis of declarations of different ideological attitudes shows that 
the leftist ones have much lower support, which confirms the general political weakness 
of the left wing in Poland. It is hard to decide, however, whether this is the result of global 
processes (leftist parties losing the social base) or of the specificity of the Polish electorate. 
Its strong roots in Christian values and the institutional role of the Catholic Church may 
suggest the latter option (Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik, 2017, pp. 189–201).
Models of Cabinet Competition
Elections are an instrument of distribution of power in democracies. They allow the members 
of the society to give their representatives the legitimacy to take decisions on behalf of the 
whole society and within the boundaries resulting from the adopted legal, and sometimes 
also customary, regulations (Wojtasik, 2013, pp. 25–38). As part of functional role understood 
this way, elections should result in the establishment of authorities that would able to form 
a stable majority and to actually rule. The way of performing this function mostly depends 
on the model of the state, since there is a difference in function performance between presi-
dential and parliamentary systems. In the first case it is necessary to form relations between 
the president and the government and legislative institutions, different in each country. In the 
case of parliamentarism, the essence of developing a stable majority refers to the existence 
of political competition models that force political parties to cooperate unless one of them 
has the majority and does not need to form a coalition. The process of cabinet formation 
in parliamentary democracies serves threefold functions: (1) to recruit individuals to the 
highest positions in the political executive; (2) to create the cabinet’s programme; (3) to en-
sure the cabinet a parliamentary base of support through the structure of the governmental 
block and the opposition block (Jednaka, 2004, p. 13).
Regarding the solutions adopted in Poland after 1989 in terms of the role of political par-
ties, we can see the initial common custom of narrowing the composition of parliamentary 
coalitions to parties with a similar origin. This, in turn, excluded some of the coalitions that 
met the criterion of mathematical possibility but were unacceptable because of their histori-
cal roots. As a result, until 2005, the syncretic model had been applied in the formation of 
cabinet coalitions in Poland (Jednaka, 2002, p. 123). The 2005 election was a breakthrough 
in this regard, because innovative mechanisms of forming coalition cabinets (different to 
the former ones) were first used. Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik (2008, p. 34) observes that: 
(1) after the 2005 election, the structures of cross-party competition first opened because 
of the innovative form of the cabinet coalition and some parties becoming relevant for the 
cabinet; (2) after the 2007 election, the ruling coalition was replaced for the first time (in 
terms of the post-Solidarity / post-communist parties), though not completely; (3) the form 
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of the ruling coalition was innovative again: a party that had only made coalitions with 
post-communist parties before was for the first time the partner of a post-Solidarity party. 
The positive expectations of forming the party system in Poland formulated by the author 
came true after the next election of 2011. It gave rise to a new situation: the restoration of the 
coalition that had been ruling before (PO-PSL). It can be regarded as a proof of advancing 
stabilization of the party system in Poland, as all the previous parliamentary elections had 
resulted in the defeat of the ruling parties. Another innovative formula of cabinet creation 
occurred after the latest parliamentary election in 2015. The coalition formed by PiS was 
the winner. For the first time in the history of Polish transformation, a competing party 
received more than a half of seats in the sejm and formed a cabinet without the need to 
negotiate with other parties.
Conclusions
The four discussed areas of change in the party system in Poland can be analyzed as part 
of the processes of consolidation of democracy and their potential regression. What is 
important, some of them can currently be treated as mechanisms deconsolidating Polish 
democracy. The presented study shows that the analyzed factors of evolution of the party 
system in Poland can be divided into two groups. Formal standards and models of compe-
tition at the cabinet can be regarded as potential factors of stabilization and consolidation 
of democratic processes. The former produced a relatively stable normative system of 
reference, resulting in the reduction of the number of registered political parties in Poland 
(Glajcar, Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik, 2017, p. 18). However, normative solutions are not a formal 
barrier to the possibility of engaging in political activity in the form of political parties. The 
latter, as a mechanism limiting political activity of citizens, could be regarded as a factor 
deconsolidating democracy. 
The models of cabinet competition have been subject to considerable evolution since 
1989. In the beginning, the created cabinets were characterized by high lability, mostly caused 
by the organizational instability of political parties. However, cabinet coalitions established 
after 2007 have been more permanent, which contributes to the consolidation of democracy. 
Its sources, apart from higher organizational stability of political parties, also include strong 
personalization of the sphere of politics. It is manifested in the growing role of party leaders, 
who are very often the strongest organizational bonds of political parties. Another proof 
of the increasing personalization of Polish political parties is the patterns of new political 
movements developing and gaining political relevance. Within the last decade, only two 
new political formations exceeded the threshold of Parliament representation. These were: 
Palikot Movement [Ruch Palikota] (later renamed Your Movement [Twój Ruch]) associated 
with Janusz Palikot, and KUKIZ’15 established by rock musician Paweł Kukiz.
The factors that undoubtedly contribute to the deconsolidation of Polish democracy 
are the evolution of the function of political parties and a change of the model of voting 
Waldemar Wojtasik 64
behaviors. In the case of functions of political parties, we can see two main phenomena with 
a negative influence on the consolidation of Polish democracy. The first of them is electoral 
determinism, which identifies each party’s significance with the support it receives. It may 
lead to political parties giving up their ideological and axiological message in favor of an 
immediate electoral result. This may contribute to representing populist and anti-system 
attitudes, especially in the situation of high level of political polarization. Another phenom-
enon connected with political parties performing their functions which can have a negative 
impact on the consolidation of democracy is the transfer of decision-making processes to the 
highest structure levels. The centralization of management of party organizations leads to 
the erosion of their social roots. Citizens begin to perceive parties as strange organizations, 
which do not represent their interests but act for the good of political elites. This is proved 
by the level of social trust in them. In a study from March 2018 (CBOS, 2018, p. 8) political 
parties were the last in the ranking of the analyzed institutions: only 23% respondents declare 
they trust political parties, and only 2% declare they definitely trust them.
Another factor that can have a negative impact on the processes of consolidation of Polish 
democracy is the consequences of voting behaviors. It is connected with faulty performance 
of the function of ensuring adequate political representation as a result of the election. In 
consolidated democracies the role of elections is to help identify the most important issues 
which due to their social importance will be attributed to different parties and voters, con-
tributing to their association with the existing system of norms and values (Rose, Mossawir, 
1967, p. 173). Since 2005, and especially since the parliamentary election in 2015, there has 
been no adequate representation of voters with leftist views at the parliamentary level. It is 
so although approximately 25% Polish voters declare leftist or center-leftist views (Wojtasik, 
2014, p. 11). In this case, the mechanism that deconsolidates the democratic regime may 
be lowering the level of legitimization of political representation acquired as a result of the 
election. Political alienation of a part of the society, who cannot see their representatives 
in the parliament and as a result may begin to oppose the consequences of democratic 
processes, will also play a role. 
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